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    I think the most interesting thing about this article is the cascade of cognitive biases among Israel’s leadership in the run-up to the Yom Kippur War. Despite a variety of sources telling them that the Egyptians and Syrians were launching an imminent attack, Golda Meir was convinced by her cabinet that there was no way that the Arabs would attack. The reasoning appeared to be, “Well, the Arabs won’t attack unless they can win; they can’t win, therefore they won’t attack.” And they stuck to this reasoning even though the Mossad was reporting on the build-up of Arab forces and King Hussein of Jordan personally flew out to tell Ms. Meir about the imminent invasion.

    It’s a sobering lesson, especially given that many of these same people had been in leadership positions for the 1967 Six-Day War. Their brilliant success in the earlier endeavor appears to have caused them to become intellectually and even emotionally invested in a particular conception of Arab decision-making (referred to in the article as The Concept), which, in turn, led them to discount and reinterpret evidence so as to strengthen their existing position, rather than updating away from it.

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